The Thucydides Trap

'History cannot give us a program for the future, but it can give us a fuller understanding of ourselves, and of our common humanity, so that we can better face the future.'

-- Robert Penn Warren

"We can learn from history, but we can also deceive ourselves when we selectively take evidence from the past to justify what we have already made up our minds to do."

-- Margaret MacMillan

Arguably, the only purpose of the past can be to inform the present. In his book, 'The Idea of History', Robin George Collingwood wrote that the ultimate 'value of history…is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is.' Departing from this philosophy, however, there has been a rise in historically informed models and applied history through Samuel Huntington, Graham Allison, and others, seeking in common to identify past trends of human behavior and applying this to shape policies for the future. Instead of informing us, Collingwood-style, on the ontology of 'what man is', they seek to forecast 'what man will do'.

These predictive historical models have arguably undermined the rigour of historical practice, downplaying specificity in favour of the general, and ultimately distorting the purpose of history to service the model. Allison's Thucydides Trap does not 'teach us […] what man is', but speculates and presents predictions on the likelihood of conflict. E. H. Carr wrote in his 'What is History', that 'the historian without his facts is rootless and futile; the facts without their historian are dead and meaningless.' This essay will argue that appropriate attention to 'facts' and the valid research of the 'historian' are key to the purpose of history, and that the example of the Thucydides Trap as a model fails to meet such purpose.

The Thucydides Trap is a term coined by political scientist Graham Alison (2011), asserting by rule, 'the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power'. It has become one of the most influential political models of the 21st-century, expanded on by Allison in his 2015 article (in which he stated that China is a 'chronic condition to be managed') and his 2017 book 'Destined for War' - in which he argued that 'China and US are on a collision course for war'. Primarily, Allison frames the economic rise of China as a threat to US dominance, using conflict occurring in twelve out of sixteen historical cases from the 16th-century to the 1990s, to argue that conflict between rising and ruling powers is determined and thus a pattern. However, this essay will argue that the model is not useful for scholarship or policy, as it reveals the methodological flaws of misappropriation, vague definitions, selection bias, and omitted variable bias. This essay will conclude that the model is also potentially dangerous, by suggesting the 'self-fulfilling' capacities of political models and criticising the agenda of the Thucydides Trap.

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The Thucydides Trap exhibits four major methodological flaws that arguably mean it fails to meet the purpose of history, and which weaken the usefulness of the model as a form of applied history. The first flaw exists in Allison's misappropriation of history, distorting the original work of Thucydides into his personal model of a 'trap'. While 'inspired' in name by Thucydides' 'History of the Peloponnesian War', Allison's use of predictive determinism does not align with the purpose of history in Thucydides' writings, which assessed universal facets of human nature (to 'counsel the modern strategist' on elements of leadership and politics). The second flaw is manifest in the vagueness of his definitional framework. The absence of clear and concise criteria for his research creates ambiguity, problematic in viewing China as a 'rising' or stagnating power. According to Allison, the 'rising power' is a catalyst for conflict, and his model fails to stand if this dynamic does not exist. A third flaw with his model is the presence of 'selection bias'. Allison promotes a deterministic, 'human' pattern by selecting Eurocentric cases in a very specific period of time, problematic for a universal 'historical' model. The final flaw is the major issue of 'omitted variable bias'. By undermining factors of time, context, and relationships such as economic interdependencies, Allison's promotion of a singular dynamic (the 'rising' and 'ruling' power) in causing historical developments, seems unsupported, particularly when the importance of 'shared interests' in present-day affairs such as tariffs and Taiwan are considered. Ultimately, this essay will argue that poor historical practice is also potentially dangerous, as applied models such as the Thucydides Trap can help generate a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' as an outcome.

The Thucydides Trap arguably takes its inspiration from an inherent misreading of Thucydides' writings. Thucydides wrote that'if [the History] be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content'. However, Allison's model has taken his writings from an exploration of human nature (which can have historical'resemblances') to posit inevitability (which must be'reflected'), while there exists no indication that'the historian (Thucydides) intends his […] analysis of the cause(s) of their war to stand as a normative model that explains all great power wars.'Thucydides did not only'focus on the inexorable, structural stress' of his context, but sought to teach us that the'dynamic between human nature, state politics and war' is a complex'interplay'. In relation to human nature, Thucydides focused on considerations of fear, honour, and interest as three areas that shape all political decision-making, but also cited numerous other factors such as military capacity, quality of leadership, depth of patriotism, national character, as well as the role of tyke (chance). He, like Collingwood (who emphasised that every historical case is specific) would reject Allison's model, which provides nothing about concrete strategic action or elements of human nature, but uses history to present a weak prediction on the likelihood of predetermined conflict (‘war is more likely than not'). In addition, Allison fundamentally misreads the case of Athens and Sparta. Misenheimer observes that, contrary to Allison's translated passage of 'the History','Thucydides simply does not say war between the Athenians and the Spartans is'inevitable' in the clear and unambiguous sense'. While Allison claimed in'Destined for War' that the primary cause of war was'the growth of the power of Athens and the fear it caused in Sparta' (the'aitia'), Thucydides took care not to undermine the role of the'prophasis'. Ancient historian T. Greer argues that'it was not an inevitable clash of fear and power that brought war to Hellas, but a very specific set of decisions made by a very specific set of leaders in the years before the war', citing important factors such as Athen's ambitious quests and rigid Corinthian demands. Misenheimer concludes that'the Thucydides Trap fallaciously presumes to take local, idiosyncratic circumstances and elevate them to the level of eternal principle', thereby reducing a'concatenation of circumstances' to a'simple declaration of inevitability'.Ultimately, Allison's use of Thucydides seems to be a mere ploy for credibility.

The Thucydides Trap also suffers the methodological flaw of'unclear definitions'. In his personal explanation of the methodology, Allison wrote that he had included'each case where a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power', but the terms'rise' and'rule' are'conventionally defined' with no further elaboration, and the'rapid shift' in'relative economic and military strength' is given no framework of time for reference. The phrase,'economic and military strength', is likewise ill-defined, with Allison failing to outline clear criteria for his research. Scholars have examined'economic strength' through GDP, resource availability, labour productivity, and presented'military strength' as actual (size, equipment, training) or potential (economic production, technology, ability to mobilise). The Thucydides Trap does not clarify how it measures economic/military'strength' and ignores areas of social stability, demographics, and so on, which becomes problematic in the example of defining China as a'rising' power.

In his article, Allison limited his assessment of China's rise to factors of GDP growth and purchasing power parity, observing China's growth on a grand scale over the past three decades. He wrote that'in 1980, China had 10 percent of America's GDP […] 6 percent of its exports. The foreign currency held by China…was just one-sixth the size of America's reserves…By 2014, those figures were 101 percent of GDP […] 106 percent of exports. China's reserves today are 28 times larger than America's.'However, specific economic, demographic and social vulnerabilities of China are ignored. Historian Arthur Waldron argues that, in domestic economics,'China's special competing interests' will have the potential to'doom its future', alluding to its possible economic stagnation as a result of limited natural resources. He reports that China has'water endowments similar to Sudan (nowhere near enough)', and exposes wasteful production from the account of'researchers in the energy sector' - where'one standard energy unit used fully produces 33 cents of product', as compared to $3 in the UK and $5.55 in Japan. In a 2023 report, the RBA also addressed the lack of demand in sectors such as property, writing that'weak consumer confidence, falling house prices [...] ongoing uncertainty regarding the completion of homes under construction have reduced the demand for new housing in China.' In addition, reports forecast that'by 2100, China's population will shrink by 600 million, and China's old-age dependency ratio will reach nearly 52 percent by mid-century' (meaning that for every two working-age individuals, there will be one person aged over 65). By extension, economic growth in areas such as the property sector will suffer: occurring already in'shrinking cities like Hegang, Fuxin, and Shuangyashan…experiencing the phenomenon of housing being sold at a'cabbage price'. Such structural vulnerabilities (which require complex solutions) seem to be incongruous with Allison's assertion of China as simply a'rising power'. His vague definition of'strength' allows him to account for the grand scale of China's national economic and military'rise', while neglecting pressing issues. It is therefore doubtful that China can be defined as a'rising power', showing his model's limitations in assessment and methodology. By failing to address these important specificities, the Thucydides Trap falls short on historical purpose, and even diminishes itself as a political science model.

A third issue with Allsion's methodology is the presence of'selection bias'. His research only spans 500 years of human history and 15 out of his 16 cases are Eurocentric, prompting researchers such as Misenheimer to reject the model's capacity to determine the presence of any'human' pattern. In his article,'Thucydides' Other Traps', he asks:'Why only these conflicts? If the rising/ruling dynamic is to be accepted as a normal pattern in human behavior, why are no examples adduced from Africa, Asia, or the indigenous peoples of the Americas or Oceania?' For example, the Pax Romana of the Roman Empire from 27 BCE to 180 BCE arguably saw a period of stable peace and prosperity, despite the ongoing competition with the Parthian empire as a'rising power'. John Poirot assessed in his 2014 report that while'Romano-Parthian relations under Augustus and the Julio-Claudians were never entirely uneventful or especially peaceful', they managed to'avert large-scale conflict' in the aftermath of the Treaty of Rhandeia (63 BCE). Allison's choice to not select such cases forfeits the universal nature of his claim: that there exists an inevitable, historical pattern of human behavior. Xi Jinping himself rejected such ideas of inevitable patterns in 2015, claiming'there is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap' and that'should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.' Political scientist Joseph Nye also argued that factors of'miscalculations, misperceptions, and rash judgments' (human agency) were more significant to developments than proposed'structural patterns', and concluded in his 2017 article that'war is a risk but not inevitable.' While it may be history's purpose to inform us of the'nature' or'patterns' of'what man is', Allison's model offers an incomplete sense of'man', and to apply the Eurocentric figure in a universal predictive model invalidates his practice.

Arguably the most significant issue with Allison's model is what Hanania describes as'omitted variable bias', defined in statistics as a'model which fails to include one or more variables'. In this case, it refers to neglecting certain causes of a specific historical development to promote a single factor - the dynamic of the'rising' and'ruling' power. Described by political scientist Paul A. Jargowsky as 'the most serious and pervasive threat to the validity of social science research', it exists in Allison's decision to downplay specificity. Hanania argues that with vast social changes through developments such as 'secularisation, explosions of wealth (since the Industrial Revolution)', the establishments of mass media, and the ability of world leaders to communicate quickly, the factors that created archaic conflicts (such as the 16th-century Franco-Habsburg War), have little relevance in a modern context. In 2017, Allison and his students appear to have realised the'changing character of war', arbitrarily revising their case file of 2015. Initially, the three most recent cases all resulted in'no war', but in 2017, USSR-Japan was replaced by Spanish-Portuguese relations in the 15th-century (no-war). Misenheimer criticises the arbitrary replacement and notes that'the effect is to eliminate the clumping of'no war' outcomes in the post–World War II age of nuclear weapons and create a fairly even distribution over the selected 500-year period'. Allison's neglect of variables such as time and context reflects a poor assessment of historical events and weak historical practice.

The omitted variable of time also impacts Allison's assessment of the'third-party' issue - in particular, the territorial dispute between China and Taiwan. Allison wrote in his 2015 article that'standard crises that would otherwise be contained 'can' produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen', and extended this in his 2018 TED Talk to the'inevitable spiral' that can be caused by a'provocative third-party' - identifying North Korea or Taiwan. In recent years, China's aggressive policy towards Taiwan has led to increased speculation that tries to confirm this, framing it as a major danger for conflict. A report by scholars Blackwill and Zelikow identified enduring Chinese ambitions of'dominant influence […] in the Indo-Pacific region' as the biggest risk, supported by escalating Chinese activities - for example, 2024 saw China fly a record-shattering 3075 flights into Taiwanese ADIZ, an 81% increase from 2023.

However, historians such as Misenheimer debunk the relevance of Allison's model to this issue, arguing that while'European conflicts in the centuries cited often involved rival claims to land (as the'rise' of a state typically meant territorial expansion), no such zero-sum problem exists between the United States and China today.' Aggressive Chinese rhetoric may be to dispel American intervention, but neither China nor the US need the territory of Taiwan. The USC has analysed Xi's speeches, concluding that instead of commitment to conflict,'Xi expresses a desire for greater technological self-sufficiency, concerns over personnel reliability and combat readiness around external influences on the cross-Strait [...] '. The article examines his 2017 December speech, when he said that'China must exert the'utmost effort' to achieve peaceful reunification' - interpreted to mean,'seeking to avoid the use of force'.51 By omitting the variables of time and geography, Allison's model draws comparisons with historical cases that are arguably irrelevant, failing to accurately assess relationships between the vastly different contexts of the 21st-century Pacific and war-dominated, 16th to 20th-century Europe. His model ultimately appears unconvincing when applied to current politics, as issues that compelled those wars (such as the'zero-sum' problem of expansion) do not apply to the relationship between geographically dispersed nations of the US and China.

The model omits further variables in the areas of'shared' modern interests and the rational considerations of national leaders. While Allison addressed this by asserting in his 2015 article that'however economically interdependent states may be— none of these factors is sufficient to prevent war, in 1914 or today', this argument seems unsupported by recent global developments. Trump's 2025 tariffs are a current example, undermining Allison by illustrating the effects of Sino-American interdependence. While the original 145% tariffs were projected to have a catastrophic impact on China, the fact that the US faces similar consequences as an'economically interdependent state' has led to almost immediate backtracks. The US relies on China for 532 key product categories, and China accounts for 50% of US soybean exports, nearly 10% of American poultry exports, and supplies roughly 72% of US rare earth imports.

These are critical for US high-tech firms and defence contractors - of which 27 have been placed on an'export control list' since April 9. As a result, nationwide chief economist Kathy Bostjancic estimated in April that, if sustained, tariffs would subtract 1 percent from US GDP growth in 2025 and raise (domestic) inflation by 0.6 percentage points. In such an interconnected world, Trump's tariffs have also risked international isolation and can push steadfast American allies to the Chinese sphere of influence. On 30 March, Japan, South Korea and China held their first economic dialogue in five years to pledge a trilateral, free trade agreement, remarkable following the Biden administration's persistent efforts to weaken Chinese relations in East Asia. On 8 April, EU president von der Leyen and Chinese premier Li Qiang held a call condemning'US trade protectionism' and the next day, the EU established 25% tariffs in retaliation to the US. Trump announced on 23 April (2025) that Chinese tariffs will be'substantially reduced' and that he would not'play hardball' during negotiations, showing that, just like Allison, he has underestimated the significance of Sino-American and global interdependence. Allison's neglect of this variable has undermined the usefulness of his predictive analysis, the limitations of the Thucydides Trap as a model.

In conclusion, the four methodological flaws of misappropriation, vague definitions, selection bias, and omitted variable bias have significantly weakened the Thucydides Trap as a valid historical model. Allison's model fails to fulfill the purpose of history - to accurately recount the past, assess its evolution, and apply relevant aspects to the present, working to understand 'what man is' and not what man will do. In addition to its limited academic usefulness, however, exists its dangerous potential. It is undeniable that Allison's model has had a significant impact on policymakers and leaders, reflected in the political rhetoric of the past decade. Martin Dempsey (Chairman of the US Government Joint Chiefs of Staff) claimed that'one of my jobs as Chairman, and as an adviser to our senior leaders, is to help avoid a Thucydides Trap', and in 2015, former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull also directed public pleas to Xi and Chinese Premier Li Kequing to not'fall into the Thucydides Trap.' While Xi rejected the Thucydides Trap in 2015, in November 2017, he ominously stated'that an increased risk of conflict between a growing power and an established power is a'rule of history.'' Despite the positive outlooks of most political leaders, the danger of promoting a self-fulfilling prophecy remains potent in political discourse. Scholar Amitav Acharya warned that despite it being'very simplistic and a little sensationalistic,'the (Thucydides' Trap) can become a self-fulfilling prophecy', becoming'dangerous because you start thinking that somehow this…concept has some analytical value.' The Thucydides Trap can fail the litmus test of historical purpose, or prove of little use as an applied tool, but the danger remains in its potential realisation - it's'self-fulfilling' drive to an outcome that could prove a genuine existential threat.

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Poirot, John. n.d. “-Claudian Foreign Policy in the First Century CE and Tacitus’ Annales the First Century CE and Tacitus’ Annales.”

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Author: Raymond Wang